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On 7th January 2013 the Anonymous hacking collective launched a White House
petition asking the Obama administration to recognize DDoS1 attacks as a valid form
of protest, similar to the Occupy protests. The ‘Occupy’ movement against ﬁnancial
inequality has become an international protest phenomenon stirring up the debate on
the legal responses to acts of civil disobedience. At the same time, online attacks in
the form of DDoS are considered by many as the digital counterparts of protesting.
While the law generally acknowledges a certain level of protection for protesting as a
manifestation of the rights to free speech and free assembly, it is still unclear whether
DDoS attacks could qualify as free speech. This paper examines the analogies
between ofﬂine protests and DDoS attacks, discusses legal responses in both cases
and seeks to explore the scope for free speech protection.
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1. Drawing analogies: the metaphor of ‘occupying cyberspace’ and DDoS attacks
The 2011 massive protests in Europe, the US, Canada and Australia presented us with
an unprecedented phenomenon of global protesting activity against ﬁnancial inequality
and wealth disparity. In spite of their different foci, these protests have generally fol-
lowed a similar pattern of ‘sit-in demonstrations’: encampments occupying squares
and public places gave people the necessary space for deliberation, transfer of knowl-
edge and exchange of ideas. This atmosphere is vividly depicted in the resolutions
issued by the delegates of the Occupy Wall Street movement in Zuccotti Park
(Shepard 2012):
By claiming public space for a public purpose, OWS (Occupy Wall Street) has increased the
freedom for all of us to take political action. Remaining confrontational but non-violent,
OWS has exposed the criminalization of peaceful protest in this city and created a space for
all of us to exercise our right to speak up and act up.2
Such protests have now been joined by an emergent form of contemporary protesting:
online protests. The Internet has been instrumental in the success and outreach of the
Occupy protests: online social networking platforms have facilitated discussion and
brought together many of the movement’s supporters. At the same time, the internet has
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also provided a new playing ﬁeld hosting a number of alleged ‘digital sit-ins’. Distributed-
Denial-of-Service attacks, widely known as DDoS, are believed by many to be one such
case of online civil-disobedience (Morozov 2011). A criminal assault in most jurisdictions,
DDoS attacks artiﬁcially create heavy trafﬁc ﬂow to a website rendering its services tem-
porarily inaccessible. That being said, both DDoS and the ‘Occupy’ protests operate in a
similar manner: occupation is used as a means of getting a message across. In January
2013 the Anonymous hacking collective highlighted this point in their petition to the
White House to recognize DDoS as a valid form of protesting. Putting aside their anarchic
ideologies, the Anonymous members asked the Government to accept DDoS attacks as acts
of protesting and to afford them full protection under the First Amendment:
With the advance in internet technology, comes new grounds for protesting. Distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS), is not any form of hacking in any way. It is the equivalent of repeatedly
hitting the refresh button on a webpage. It is, in that way, no different than any ‘occupy’
protest. Instead of a group of people standing outside a building to occupy the area, they are
having their computer occupy a website to slow (or deny) service of that particular website
for a short time.3
To what extent are DDoS attacks occupying cyberspace, the same way protestors occupy
public spaces and squares to promote their causes? This paper will examine whether
DDoS are indeed the digital counterpart to sit-ins. It seeks to explore on what grounds
–if any – DDoS could qualify as free speech meriting constitutional protection. The reper-
toire (Tilly 1984) of collective actions gaining new dimensions online is a topic often
explored in the ﬁeld of social sciences4, yet is somewhat under-discussed with respect to
its legal status. With regard to DDoS, law scholars have addressed relevant questions of
cybercrime legislation (Edwards 2006; Faﬁnski 2008), philosophical dimensions (Klang
2004a, 2004b), liability (Kreimer 2001) and democratic engagement (McLaurin 2011);
however its constitutional protection as free speech is an area hardly explored in the litera-
ture. This paper offers a snapshot of DDoS as ‘digital sit-ins’: their understanding as a form
of online civil disobedience combined further with the viability of a free speech defence will
hopefully inform the literature as to this new form of collective action.
In doing so, this paper approaches the issue from three different vantage points: a tech-
nical, a philosophical and a legal inquiry seek to explore the nature of DDoS attacks. First
the technical aspects of DDoS are brieﬂy examined. Identifying DDoS’ main features and
functions will contribute towards addressing further the analogy between DDoS attacks and
physical protests. While they seem to share similar patterns and features, this by itself would
not be enough to justify the legality of DDoS as protected acts of protest. For this purpose,
the paper ﬁrst explores the link between DDoS and civil disobedience. Regarded in iso-
lation, this may be of little signiﬁcance to a legal evaluation of DDoS; civil disobedience
itself embracing the idea of transgressing the law. Next, the paper goes on to evaluate
DDoS as acts meriting free speech protection. Ultimately, the paper strives to further
provide criteria for the legal deﬁnition and understanding of DDoS and to inform the rel-
evant literature.
Relevant case law and legislation is reviewed for this purpose, while a technical over-
view of DDoS is deemed essential to give a much needed background to the paper.
Although a detailed analysis would fall outside the scope of this paper, understanding
how DDoS generally occur will help in reviewing whether such attacks can be regarded
as the digital equivalent of sit-ins. Next follows a brief account of the main methods
employed to orchestrate DDoS attacks as well as their key features.
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2. Technical aspects and main features of DDoS attacks
DDoS,5 short for Distributed-Denial-of-Services attacks, is a proscribed act in most jurisdic-
tions: in the UK it is an offence, under sections 36 and 3A7 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990,
while in the US, DDoS are considered a felony under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act at
18 USC. § 1030. The pervasive manner, in which these attacks operate, explains why DDoS
are treated as punishable criminal acts. DDoS operate on the orchestrated actions of users en
masse. Distribution is the main feature of this kind of web attacks: An overload of requests for
information is sent simultaneously to the web-server under attack from various distributed
non-users. To complicate things further, these requests can also be generated automatically
by a remotely controlled botnet, namely a coordinated network of software programmes
that perform an automated process. In doing so these attacks seek to create false trafﬁc, satu-
rate the network’s available resources and to ultimately disrupt its normal function by making
it unavailable for its actual users.
There are many techniques to overload a system’s server, all of which seem to exploit
the net infrastructure and the way in which communication between computers is set out.
That being said a detailed account of all possible cases of DDoS would be more suitable for
a paper focusing on the taxonomy of DDoS attacks; as such, it would not add to this paper’s
purpose, which is the legal evaluation of DDoS as forms of protest. One point is worth
noting here: regardless of the speciﬁc technique used to launch a series of DDoS attacks,
their function is based, in the majority of cases, on exploiting the basic elements of the
net infrastructure. This observation helps us to identify the main features of the DDoS
attacks, which can be summarised in the following three key points.
(1) Massive participation
Generating multiple requests to overwhelm the targeted website is a task that nor-
mally presupposes massive participation of users synchronising their requests.8
(2) Disruption of communication as a means of getting a message across
Users participating in DDoS attacks anticipate temporary failure of the targeted
website while at the same time also accept the possibility of personal damage.
(3) Exploitation of the security holes of the server and the net infrastructure Online
communication
relies heavily on mutual trust between peers: interdependent security is a concep-
tual element of the net architecture, which unfortunately also makes it very vulner-
able to hacking.
Since the early documented cases of DDoS attacks, the methods, motives and ideologies
supporting them have undergone some major changes: from purely politically driven acts,
DDoS are now launched for various reasons, including vigilantism, blackmailing and
revenge. Note, for example, the 2013 DNS attack on Spamhaus, described as one of
the biggest cyber-attacks in history, affecting millions of users. The escalating attacks
against Spamhaus have been attributed to Cyberbunker, a web hosting provider, as retalia-
tion for the latter’s inclusion in Spamhaus spammer blacklists. Yet, in spite of a broader
course of action and motives, DDoS are still largely characterized by massive partici-
pation, disruption of communications and reliance on the net’s structural vulnerabilities.
Most importantly, these features can be further discussed in the context of civil disobe-
dience: discussing what constitutes an act of civil disobedience and comparing such
cases to DDoS could provide useful guidance as to whether they would merit free
speech protection.
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3. DDoS as an act of civil disobedience? A philosophical inquiry
In one of the ﬁrst documented cases of DDoS, the Electronic Disturbance Theatre (EDT)
attacks against the websites of the White House and the Mexican president Zedillo (Dom-
inguez 2009; Lane 2003) in 1998, a series of automatically generated bad requests were
used to block access as a means of protest for paramilitary practices against indigenous
people in Chiapas. EDT’s co-founder, Ricardo Dominguez, has described these attacks
as acts of civil disobedience, equivalent to a digital sit-in. In this respect, he appears to
be echoing Rawls’ deﬁnition of a civil disobedience act being a ‘public, non-violent and
conscientious act contrary to law ... with the intent to bring about a change in the policies
or law of the government’ (Rawls 1996). The remainder of this paper critically examines
whether this proposition holds any truth.
There has been much debate as to whether DDoS are to be perceived as acts of online
civil disobedience or should be approached with scepticism as to their impact and methods.
Denning (2001) introduces three main categories of online social movements: activism,
‘hacktivism’ and ‘cyberterrorism’. Whereas online activism is largely a non-violent compu-
ter mediated means of protest,9 ‘hacktivism’ and ‘cyber-terrorism’ suggest disruptive and
thus illegal uses of computers. Samuel (2004) posits that ‘hacktivism’ in particular relies on:
the nonviolent use of illegal or legally ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends.
These tools include web site defacements, redirects, denial-of-service attacks, information
theft, web site parodies, virtual sit-ins, virtual sabotage, and software development.
As such, ‘hacktivism’ is found to be consistent with the philosophy of civil disobedience
(Manion and Goodrum 2000; Wray 1998), whose acts are illegal by deﬁnition and
employ non-violent methods to restore the injustices encountered in law.10 Yochai
Benkler has recently described the ‘Anonymous’ online network group, known for its
wide use of DDoS attacks, as
[A]n idea, a zeitgeist, coupled with a set of social and technical practises. Diffuse and leader-
less, its driving force is ‘lulz’– irreverence, playfulness, and spectacle. It is also a protest move-
ment, inspiring action both on and off the internet that seeks to contest the abuse of power by
governments and corporations and promote transparency in politics and business.
Benkler then goes on to identify four techniques used by the ‘Anonymous’ hacking collec-
tive to launch their attacks -one of which is DDoS- and highlights their non-violent nature.
DDoS, he argues:
causes disruption, not destruction, and the main technique that Anonymous has used requires
participants to join self-consciously and publicly, leaving the internet addresses traceable. By
design these are sit-ins: Participants illegally occupy the space of their target.11
Benkler’s view has been met with scepticism. It has been argued12 that DDoS do not qualify
as a form of acceptable civil disobedience for two reasons: the low personal cost assumed
by the participants and their operating routine, which is predominantly an attack against
data-ﬂow. The relatively easy participation in DDoS attacks, which does not incur any sig-
niﬁcant personal cost for the participants, takes away the element of a public act, normally
met in acts of civil disobedience. In other words, cyber-attacks lack the public quality of
normal acts of civil disobedience, since the latter are meant to make a statement through
the risk incurred for their participants. This type of online activism by simply contributing
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with a few clicks from the safety of one’s home ﬁts better the description of ‘slacktivism’:13
‘feel good online activism that has zero political or social impact’ (Morozov 2010).
3.1. Low participatory threshold
The distinction drawn between internet-supported and internet-based action in the Van Laer
and Van Aelst’s (2010) typology of the ‘new digitalized action repertoire’ clariﬁes this point
further. The additional criteria of low or high participatory thresholds in these two sets of
actions present us with four sets of online collective actions: internet-supported action
with low and with high participatory thresholds, and internet-based action with low and
with high participatory thresholds.14 According to the same typology, DDoS are furnishing
us with an example of an internet-based action with a low participatory threshold: the often
low personal costs entailed, the weak ties noticed between the participants and the adver-
sarial nature of such acts instigated by the ‘hacktivism ethics’ seem to be key in most
DDoS attacks.
DDoS seem to be quite similar yet somehow different from cases of civil disobedience;
the latter is, by deﬁnition, illegal as it involves overcoming the general duty to obey the law
due to its conﬂict with the Rawlsian ‘more stringent obligations’ (Rawls 1971). However,
the fact that participation in DDoS is facilitated by simply downloading a certain piece of
software, without assuming any additional risks or putting in extra efforts to join these
attacks, suggests that DDoS are of somewhat inferior rigour to acts of civil disobedience.
Even if we accept that the openness and accountability of DDoS attacks15 suggest that
some personal costs might be entailed through participation in such attacks, this would
still not be high a sufﬁciently high threshold to fully equate DDoS with ofﬂine cases of
civil disobedience.
That being said, participation in DDoS attacks does not presuppose a high level of
expertise in hacking techniques (Yar 2006). Take, for example, the Low Orbit Ion
Cannon (LOIC) used in the ‘Anonymous’ DDoS attacks. LOIC is an application developed
by hackers that, when activated, renders control of the computer to a central Anonymous
Administrator to reload a targeted website, generate a great number of requests and to ulti-
mately overwhelm the website causing it to crash. In a way, this could be described as will-
ingly rendering authorization to a hacker to take control of a computer’s network
connection. The low risk a LOIC user run is combined with the ease of participating by
simply downloading this application. As such, participation in the Anonymous DDoS
attacks suggests a lower threshold compared with ofﬂine acts of civil disobedience.
3.2. Disruption of communication
Another argument put forth to justify free speech protection for DDoS as acts of civil disobe-
dience is that hacking collectives launch these attacks to allegedly ‘promote free speech’.
Anonymous have often referred to freedom of speech by linking this right to their online
activity: while launching a DDoS attack on Warner Bros and IFPI in 2010 after a court
decision against Pirate Bay, the group linked their actions to free speech through the follow-
ing words of warning: ‘We will continue to attack websites of those who are a danger to
freedom on the internet.Wewill continue to attack thosewho embrace censorship’.16 Accord-
ing to another Anonymous statement, the ‘intentions are to change the current way the gov-
ernments of the world and the people view true Freedom of Speech and The Internet.’17
On the other hand many of their launched DDoS attacks target websites that are con-
sidered to be promoting internet censorship: in 2009, Anonymous took down the Australian
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Prime Minister’s site following governmental plans for ISP-level blocking. One year later,
Anonymous launched DDoS attacks on Sony for taking legal action against two coders
whose tools allowed for Linux to run on the PS3. In 2011, several DDoS attacks were
launched on 91 websites of the Malaysian Government as a response to ISP-level denial
of access to the WikiLeaks website. The list of documented DDoS attacks for promoting
the rights of free speech and access to information online is long.
As Coleman observes (2011), hackers seem to embrace liberal values such as free
speech, however their politics are somewhat different from traditional liberalism as they
‘are fundamentally grounded in acting through building’. However, whether this link
with free speech is sufﬁcient for DDoS to be considered as a digital sit-in akin to the
civil rights movement remains to be seen.
4. DDoS as an act of protest meriting free speech protection?
In 1960, four black students entered a Woolworth’s department store in Greensboro in
North Carolina, USA, and took seats in a whites-only area. The arrest of those participating
sparked a series of similar sit-ins. In the end, it was the black community’s boycott against
Greensboro’s department stores and the revenue losses caused by the sit-ins that led to the
shop owners changing their segregation policies. Could DDoS be described as acts of civil
disobedience along the lines of Greensboro sit-ins?
In the previous section, it was shown that DDoS attacks seem to share some common
traits with acts of civil disobedience; however, their technical aspects and participatory stan-
dards would not allow for a direct analogy to sit-ins. The remainder of the paper will con-
sider the general argument that such an analogy suggests: DDoS as a protesting act meriting
free speech protection. This argument has been used time and again for the legal defence
used in cases of arrested hackers involved in DDoS attacks. In September 2011, Jay Leider-
man, the defence lawyer of a hacker accused of attacking the computer servers of Santa
Cruz County in California, described DDoS as a protest, being ‘no different than physically
occupying a space’. Suggesting with his defence that DDoS attacks are protected under the
First Amendment, Leiderman added that DDoS ‘is no different from occupying the Wool-
worth’s lunch counter in the civil rights era’.18 In a similar vein, following the arrest of the
student Mercedes Haefer on July 2011 for being a member of the ‘Anonymous group’
involved in DDoS attacks, her lawyer regarded this prosecution as political, offering the
following analogy: ‘When Obama orders supporters to inundate the switchboards of Con-
gress, that’s good politics, when a bunch of kids decide to send a political message with
roots going back to the civil rights movement and the revolution, it’s something else’.19
It is of course no coincidence that such an argument has been put forward in the US,
where First Amendment protection is frequently sought to avoid the distressing application
of the law in such cases as those under review here. The First Amendment doctrine embo-
dies principles that forbid the abridgement not only of speech but also of conduct (Nimmer
1973). In the words of Justice Brennan, conduct may be ‘sufﬁciently imbued with elements
of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments’.20 If the
conduct under review is found to convey a political message, it falls within the remit of pol-
itical speech, and as such it is granted First Amendment protection. This explains the added
emphasis in this paper on the legal status of DDoS under the First Amendment and less on
its free speech protection in other jurisdictions.
In reviewing DDoS as free speech, the remainder of the paper explores whether the
arguments supporting the view that DDoS are akin to sit-ins are strong enough to grant
them free speech protection. Next, there follows a discussion of DDoS on the justiﬁcatory
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basis of expressive conduct, public forum and proportionality. The initial observations in the
ﬁrst part of this paper describing DDoS will now be further utilized to provide for answers.
4.1. The expressive boycott argument
The treatment of DDoS as expressive boycotts could provide an argument for granting such
acts free speech protection. At ﬁrst glance, it seems that the main features of DDoS attacks
assimilate those of expressive boycott, namely protesting acts of an obstructive nature.
Fenwick (1999) suggests that protesting acts can be grouped into the following categories:
‘peaceful persuasion, offensive or insulting persuasion, intimidation, symbolic or persua-
sive physical obstruction or interference, actual physical obstruction or interference, force-
ful physical obstruction and violence’. DDoS seem to fall under the remit of the fourth
category, i.e. the acts could be described as persuasive interference as they seem to be com-
bining both interference, as well as the intention to convey a message through the act. DDoS
involve direct action in order to draw public attention to a cause and appear to be both
obstructive and persuasive in the sense that they seek to gain publicity and convey a
message to the public by overloading a targeted website.
When reviewing acts of persuasive interference, judges are willing to accept any illeg-
alities and to grant free speech protection provided that the act of protest has resorted to
obstruction as a means of gaining publicity and getting a message across, which would
otherwise have been impossible. The reason for protecting such obstructive acts, as
Fenwick explains, is equality. Minorities and marginalised groups, whose causes are
often poorly represented in the media, should be granted a certain level of free speech pro-
tection even at the expense of the rights of others. Fenwick (2002) reminds us of a few
obstructive protesting cases concerning environmental issues, UK in the late 1980s, such
as hunting or ﬁshing saboteurs, motorway bypass protesters and those protesting against
the supply and sale of veal.
The similarity such acts bear with DDoS is uncanny; in this respect there might be room
for manoeuvre in asking for free speech protection on the grounds of equality. However, it
would be objectionable to suggest that the hacking groups behind DDoS attacks are margin-
alized minorities. Anonymous have linked their name with many DDoS attacks: Operation
Payback in 2010 and Operation Darknet in 2011 are a few notable examples of their highly
diverse online actions. However, they could hardly be described as a marginalized group
with no other outlet to communicate their messages: the fact that they feature in the
Time’s list of the 100 most inﬂuential people in the world and in the well-attended
‘Million Mask March’ demonstrations organized on 5 November 2013 in 400 cities in
support of Anonymous are strong evidence of a highly popular group.
That being said, the argument of expressive boycott would be particularly attractive in
the US, as the relevant case-law there seems to favour free speech protection to allow the
disadvantaged minorities in order that their voices be heard. Justice Black has described
such a constitutional protection as ‘essential to the poorly ﬁnanced causes of little
people’21 in accepting the right to distribute leaﬂets door-to-door. In a similar vein,
Justice Brennan quoting Justice Black in his dissent in FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Association, stating that:
expressive boycotts are irreplaceable as a means of communication because they are essential
to the ‘poorly ﬁnanced causes of the little people’. It is no accident that boycotts were used
by the American colonists to throw off the British yoke and by the oppressed to assert their
civil rights.22
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 7
The concern for promoting the right to free speech on equal grounds for all, even those with
unpopular views, has always been at the heart of the First Amendment. However, limit-
ations are still in place, especially when the level of violence in the protesting acts is dis-
proportionate to the means used. As noted in NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co (458
U.S. 916–917):
The First Amendment does not protect violence . . . . No federal rule of law restricts a State
from imposing tort liability for business losses that are caused by violence and by threats of
violence. When such conduct occurs in the context of constitutionally protected activity,
however, ’precision of regulation’ is demanded . . . . Speciﬁcally, the presence of activity pro-
tected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to damages
liability and on the persons who may be held accountable for those damages.
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, it has been explained that DDoS incur signiﬁcant economic
losses for the targeted websites and are generally regarded as a highly dangerous threat
of cyber security. It can therefore be concluded that the free speech protection on expressive
boycotts would not stand much chance under judicial review. On the other hand, the claim
that the state has a positive duty in promoting free expression and assembly online on the
grounds of preserving an open public forum could be a more convincing proposition. Next,
follows a legal evaluation of the public forum argument and the ways this could apply in
DDoS.
4.2. The public forum argument
4.2.1. Websites as forums
The public forum doctrine evoked in a series of convictions of protesters in the civil rights
movement of the late 1950s, and the Anti-war movement of the 1970s seems to be a strong
argument for considering DDoS as protected speech. Under this doctrine, space is acknowl-
edged as a substantive element of the right to free speech; to exercise this right a forum is
required. Mitchell (2003) posits that this may also apply to electronically mediated speech.
Hence, in not allowing someone to address an audience effectively in a public forum, the
state might be infringing his right to free speech. Of course, this is not to imply that the state
carries the absolute obligation to refrain from any regulation of speech and assembly. The
levels of scrutiny to which free speech regulations are subject vary depending on the type of
forum: traditional public forums, such as parks and streets, entail more restrictions on the
way speech and assembly are to be regulated, whereas non-public designated forums and
privately-owned property allow for a higher level of speech restriction (Post 1987).
With regard to DDoS, it still remains unclear whether the doctrine of public forum
would be deemed sufﬁcient to justify such attacks in spite of the tresspassory nature.
Although there has been much debate in the literature as to online spatiality and property
(Burk 2000; Epstein 2003; Grimmelmann 2010; Karanasiou 2012), it is generally accepted
that a website can be a privately-owned space. This seems to be implied also by Section 3 of
the UK Computer Misuse Act 1990,23 which criminalized all acts of interfering with a com-
puter knowingly without authorization.
Whenever UK jurisprudence is faced with the question of balancing between the rights
to assembly and private property, it has always sought an answer to the law of trespass
(Clayton 2000). Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 is clear on this matter, as it
regards as tresspassory assemblies held in privately/semi-privately owned places with
restricted or no access for the public. Although the doctrine of public forum is generally
recognised in the relevant UK case-law, s.16 of the Public Order Act 1986 deﬁnes public
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forum in terms of expressed or implied permission for public access. In this respect, one
might initially be under the impression that DDoS are actually not unauthorized acts, as
the main purpose of a website lies in the very fact of accepting online visitors.
This point has actually been argued by the defendant in DPP v Lennon,24 the ﬁrst reported
DDoS conviction in the UK concerning a case of mass emails. In this case, the court initially
ruled that DDoS were not covered by the Computer Misuse Act, as they were not authorised
acts. This was, however, overturned on appeal and resulted in the addition of Sections 33–36
of the Police and Justice Act 2006 to broaden the scope of the Computer Misuse Act so as to
include DDoS as well.25 No implied consent can de deduced ‘from the fact that the server has
an open as opposed to a restricted conﬁguration’.26 It is therefore clear that DDoS as a crim-
inally proscribed act suggests trespass and as such it does not qualify for free speech protec-
tion in the UK. On a further note, it is likely that DDoS would also not fall within the
protective scope of art 10 ECHR. The ECtHR has in certain cases27 accepted that restrictions
of peaceful yet obstructive protests can be disproportionate, yet it is doubtful whether DDoS
could be seen as a type of peaceful protest.
On the other side of the Atlantic, open access in the US has been regarded as a main
feature of public forums, even when they are privately owned (Kreimer 2001). Take, for
example, the cases of protesting in shopping malls, regarded as expressive conduct in
quasi-private places. In Robins v Prune Yard Shopping Centre,28 the California Supreme
Court held that shopping malls constituted an invaluable forum for exercising free
speech, as they were freely accessible by the public (Epstein 1997). Could DDoS be justi-
ﬁed along these lines on the understanding that targeted websites are openly accessible
online? The fact that there are cases29 where the system itself allows for easy access
seems to suggest that trespass cannot be easily argued. As shown earlier, the net infrastruc-
ture is actually aiding the success of DDoS (Mirkovic and Reiher 2004): the core net prin-
ciples of trust between peers, distributed control and interdependent security make the
internet exploitable to DDoS. However, on its own, the ability to use the system so as to
launch such attacks does not sufﬁce justifying DDoS as authorized acts. DDoS are most
likely to be reviewed as protests on private forums and, as such, any possible free
speech defences are to be sought in this respect.
4.2.2. Symbolic forums and the rule of law
Taking a closer look at case law addressing protests on private forums, it appears that First
Amendment protection may still be applicable for symbolic reasons. Namely, in cases
where public protests occur on certain private properties, which are symbolic and essential
for drawing attention to and conveying a message, the First Amendment protects these acts
unless there are ample alternatives for gaining wide attention.30 In this vein, it has been
ruled that boycotting,31 picketing near schools32 or outside abortion clinics33 are cases
falling within the protective scope of the First Amendment. However, if we are to consider
DDoS as an act of civil disobedience, similar to civil rights movements and sit-ins, it should
be noted that ‘violent conduct is beyond the pale of constitutional protection’.34 Namely, in
cases of civil rights movements, although it is generally recognised that sit-ins are a power-
ful method of communication and protest35 – which should not be restricted simply
because they occur on private property – such acts do not enjoy absolute free speech pro-
tection at the expense of private property.
The sit-in case of Bell v. Maryland offers an interesting analogy to DDoS in this respect.
In the times of the racist practices of segregation in places of public accommodation in the
American South of the 1960s, 12 students were arrested and charged with criminal trespass
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 9
for entering and occupying a ‘whites only’ eating area at a restaurant in Baltimore. The appel-
lants’ position that ‘the right of free speech is not circumscribed by the mere fact that it occurs
on private property’36 was not able to convince the Court of Appeals that public protest could
not trump the personal autonomy of the proprietor to conduct business by exercising discri-
minatory practices on this property. As the Court of Appeals noted further, the right ‘to speak
freely and to make public protest does not impart a right to invade or remain upon the property
of private citizens, so long as private citizens retain the right to choose their guests or custo-
mers’.37 The Supreme Court however had a different view, which could perhaps be of use in
building a free speech defence for DDoS. In their concurrences, Justices Douglas and Gold-
berg argued for a right to access public accommodations along the lines of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees of equal protection. Granting the protestors a right to access,
Justice Goldberg further noted that ‘the broad acceptance of the public in this and in other
restaurants clearly demonstrates that the proprietor’s interest in private or unrestricted associ-
ation is slight.’38 Could this also be argued in the case of DDoS attacks?
In the previous section it has been shown that DDoS attacks could be considered acts of
civil disobedience, whose expressive component is a non-verbal type of symbolic speech.
That being said, it has also been contended that the state’s duty to secure public order jus-
tiﬁes certain restrictions to avoid the breach of peace. Namely, it is generally understood
that under no jurisdictions are public protests immune to total restriction, especially
when there is danger that a breach of peace will occur. The need for the state to secure
public order outweighs the signiﬁcance of speech on such occasions, even when speech
takes place in a public forum. This perception of public order as a value of utmost impor-
tance is mostly evident in the UK public protest cases,39 yet can also be found in US case
law40 in general. Given their disruptive nature and the fact that they target communications
per se, it seems unlikely that DDoS are assimilating the Greensboro sit-ins. In Bell, the
Supreme Court has been able to reach this decision based on the fact that the protestors
peacefully took seats in the restaurant and read their school books when the staff denied
services. As there was no danger that a breach of peace might occur, their constitutional
right to free speech and assembly still applied and granted them the right to access a
place of public accommodation.41 However, regarding DDoS, it seems that regarding
them as a peaceful sit-in would not be an attractive argument due to their pervasive nature.
The Anonymous describe DDoS as a way of overwhelming a server with UDP trafﬁc,
which ‘does no permanent damage and doesn’t involve breaking into services or stealing
data’.42 However, DDoS are indeed a punishable action in most jurisdictions, which can
cause serious damage to the targeted website in terms of economic loss: losses in revenue,
market capitalisation and consumer conﬁdence are added to the extra cost incurred for devel-
oping a robust protective infrastructure to protect the website from future DDoS; a 2012
Neustar report estimated that they cost online retailers an average of $100,000 per hour.43
Such ﬁndings highlight the pervasive and harmful nature of DDoS and thus leave in place
ample authority for the proposition that the claim for the right to free speech of those launch-
ing DDoS attacks would have a low chance of success in judicial review.
Returning to Bell, Justice Black based his opinion on performing a balancing act
between free speech and rule of law, instead of private property. While admitting that peti-
tioners had a constitutional right to express their views, he remarked that this would not
yield them a right to ‘force other people to supply a platform or a pulpit’ (344, 345). He
further added that ‘whatever power it may allow the States or grant to the Congress to regu-
late the use of private property, the Constitution does not confer upon any group the right to
substitute rule by force for rule of law’ (346). In this respect, it would be unlikely that DDoS
could be considered as a sit-in protected by the First Amendment.
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4.3. DDoS and the slippery slope of free speech restriction
The previous sections examined the arguments of expressive boycott and public forum and
found that the scope of their application in cases of DDoS attacks is narrow. In addition, free
speech protection for DDoS would also be problematic in terms of proportionality. For if we
were to declare that DDoS merits constitutional protection as free speech, at the same time
we would meet with the most emphatic contradiction: as DDoS is nothing but a tool des-
tined to cause disruption, it has also been frequently associated with attacks on human rights
and media sites, resulting in online censorship of their content.
A series of cases reported in recent years of DDoS used as cyber censorship tools show
this. In March 2012, the news site Uznews.net in Uzbekistan was reported to be ofﬂine due
to severe DDoS attacks. A similar case was also reported in 2010 when six human rights
organisations suffered DDoS attacks after the airing of controversial video footage expos-
ing human rights abuses. Moreover, the purposes of launching DDoS attacks against a
website are not always related to noble causes. In some reported cases DDoS are used as
means of pursuing illegal activities, most speciﬁcally online extortion: in 2011 a Du¨sseldorf
court convicted a man of hiring the services of a Russian botnet, who blackmailed German
bookmaking websites under the threat of DDoS attacks during the World Cup in South
Africa.
The reports published by the Berkman Centre for Internet 2010 football and Society at
the University of Harvard (Roberts et al. 2011; Zuckerman et al 2010) demonstrate some
alarming ﬁndings regarding the threatening effects that DDoS might have for online
freedom of speech. The study surveyed 317 independent media organisations in nine
countries and discovered media reports of 140 DDoS attacks against more than 280 differ-
ent human rights sites. To sustain such attacks, the targeted sites would have to partly sacri-
ﬁce their independence and seek protection from giant companies such as Google and
Facebook, which are substantial hosting providers who could defend the attacked websites.
In the reports, DDoS are described as an increasing ‘technique for silencing human rights
and independent media sites’, posing major internet security challenges.
In this vein, it is further noted that DDoS are not just harmful for the personal autonomy
and entrepreneurial activity of the proprietor of the targeted website but they also infringe
on his or her right to free speech and on the users’ right to online access. As such, not only
would DDoS not qualify as free speech but their legal treatment could further involve a
positive obligation of the state to guarantee the right to free speech for everyone. This is
made explicit by Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression:
Given that access to basic commodities such as electricity remains difﬁcult in many developing
States, the Special Rapporteur is acutely aware that universal access to the Internet for all indi-
viduals worldwide cannot be achieved instantly. However, the Special Rapporteur reminds all
States of their positive obligation [emphasis added] to promote or to facilitate the enjoyment of
the right to freedom of expression and the means necessary to exercise this right, including the
Internet [emphasis added].44
5. Concluding remarks
The argument that DDoS are the digital equivalent of sit-ins is an attractive one. The fact
that such acts largely rely on massive participation (at least in principle) and employ
obstructive means to get their message across highlights a similarity with acts of civil dis-
obedience. Carl Kaplan offers a fairly accurate description of DDoS in this respect, placing
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this activity ‘somewhere between a digital sit-in and “cybotage”’, the act of sabotaging
computers in a rather aggressive manner. Of course, the similarity to civil disobedience
should not be overlooked. In the words of Critical Art Ensemble, a group of hacktivists:
as in civil disobedience, primary tactics in electronic civil disobedience are trespass and block-
age. Exits, entrances, conduits, and other key spaces must be occupied by the contestational
[sic] force in order to bring pressure on legitimized institutions engaged in alleged unethical
or criminal actions.45
However, this cannot further suggest that DDoS merit the free speech protection granted to
the civil rights movement protests decades ago. This paper has explored all grounds on
which free speech protection for DDoS could be argued. First, their free speech protection
as expressive conduct is explored. At ﬁrst glance, this seems a convincing proposition: in
spite of their obstructive nature, such acts may be granted free speech protection to ensure
equality of expressive outlets. However, it can hardly be argued that the Anonymous are a
marginalized group. Even so, most DDoS attacks result in signiﬁcant economic losses for
the targeted websites, and they seem to be the most destructive of all available means of
getting a message across online; the potential of free speech protection on grounds of equal-
ity would thus lack proportionality. Their destructive nature has also been key in rejecting
any free speech protection on the grounds of securing a public forum. Although it is agreed
that the internet is an open communicatory platform, accessible to all to voice their opinion,
this does not offer absolute immunity to otherwise proscribed acts. Moreover, the mere fact
that DDoS obstruct online communications is enough to preclude free speech protection; on
the contrary, positive state action under the First Amendment might be sought against them.
It may sometimes be the case that DDoS target websites in order to stiﬂe free speech by
blocking access.
That said, the possibility of free speech protection for DDoS cannot be completely ruled
out. This paper has considered all possible defences and has theoretically examined their
validity. However, there is no such thing as one size ﬁts all. Bearing in mind the variety
of methods employed and the main features of DDoS attacks, ambiguity and complexity
have hitherto been unavoidable. The arguments provided here should be contextualized
and further discussed on an ad hoc basis. At the moment there is a lack of documented
cases of judicial review of DDoS on the grounds of free speech protection. However, the
increase in volume, duration and frequency of such attacks suggests that it is only a
matter of time before such claims are lodged. The paper has kept a clear focus on the
US free speech jurisprudence: in the wake of President Obama’s ‘Improving Critical Infra-
structure Cyber-security’ executive order, issued in February 2012, combating DDoS is
now vital on the grounds of national security. Whether DDoS still fall within the protective
scope of the First Amendment remains to be seen, and should be an interesting
development.
On balance, the overall picture seems to be that DDoS cannot be considered as the
digital parallel to the occurrence of sit-ins in ofﬂine reality: the fact that DDoS are pro-
scribed acts of a particularly aggressive nature combined with the threats incurred for
free speech online would undercut the feasibility of granting them free speech protection.
As a ﬁnal remark, it should be noted that instead of resorting to misleading metaphors, it is
essential to articulate a robust conceptual framework regarding DDoS and other acts of
‘hacktivism’, which deserves more attention than this paper has been able to give it. To
do otherwise would risk criminalising the tools and net architectural principles exploited
to facilitate DDoS attacks.
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Notes
1. Distributed Denial of Service attacks, thereafter referred to as DDoS
2. Shepard (2012, 125–126).
3. https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/make-distributed-denial-service-ddos-legal-form-pro-
testing/X3drjwZY.
4. For more see Ayres (2003, 132–143); Clark and Themudo (2003, 109–126); Costanza-Schock
(2003, 173–191); Diani (2000, 386–401); Garrett (2006, 202–224); Rheingold (1993); Van
Laer and Aelst (2010, 1–26); van de Donk et al. (2004).
5. Although this paper examines the case of DDoS, it tends to use DDoS and DoS interchangeably
for reasons of simplicity and coherence. It should however be noted that there are certain differ-
ences between the two.
6. Added by section 36 of the Police and Justice Act 2006.
7. Which came into force on 1 October 2008.
8. However, it should also be noted that there are other ways to automatically generate multiple
requests with the use of botnets controlled by one single person launching the attacks.
9. See also McCaughey and Ayers (2003).
10. For an interesting comparison between the philosophies underpinning civil disobedience and
online civil disobedience acts, mostly undertaken by the online collective of electro hippies
see Klang (2004a).
11. Y Benkler ‘Hacks of Valor: Why Anonymous is Not a Threat to National Security’, Foreign
Affairs, available online at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137382/yochai-benkler/
hacks-of-valor., accessed 3 May 2013. For a similar view see also Klang (2004b).
12. Tom Watson ‘Denial of Service, Denial of Speech’, available online at http://tomwatson.
typepad.com/tom watson/2010/12/denial-of-service-denial-of-speech.htm, accessed 3 May
2013.
13. See Gladwell and Shirky (2011) arguing that social movements in general are not made possible
just by utilising online media. On the other side of this debate, there are also theorists who
believe in the great power social media in general have to mobilize the masses and to bring
about social change (Castells 2012). For a good account on the relevant debate see Fuchs
(2012).
14. An internet-supported action with low participatory threshold is, for example, an online
donation, whereas an example of the same action with a high participatory threshold is the
organisation of transnational social movements such as the World Social Forum.
15. Note, for example, the electrohippies collective stating that their identities are easily traceable
online as they do not use encrypted methods of communication (http://www.iwar.org.uk/
hackers/resources/electrohippies-collective/op1.pdf, accessed 3 May 2013).
16. http://anti-ddos.blogspot.co.uk/2010/12/incesed-by-court-decision-to-jail.html, accessed 3 May
2013.
17. http://www.abc.net.au/technology/articles/2010/12/09/3089466.htm, accessed 3 May 2013.
18. R Reilly, ‘’Homeless Hacker’ lawyer: DDOS isn’t an attack, it’s a digital sit-in’, available online
at http://web.archive.org/web/20130120090931 at http://idealab.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/
09/homeless-hacker-lawyer-ddos-isnt-an-attack-its-a-digital-sit-in.php, accessed 3 May 2013.
19. M. Masnick, ‘Lawyer for accused: DDoS is a legal form of protest’, available online at
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110930/02323316145/lawyer-accused-ddos-is-legal-
form-protest.shtml, accessed 3 May 2013.
20. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. (1989).
21. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
22. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S. 411, 451 (1990).
23. Added by section 36 of the Police and Justice Act 2006.
24. DPP v Lennon [2005] EWCA Crim 2150.
25. See also Faﬁnski (2008) 53.
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 13
26. DPP v Lennon [2006] EWHC 1201 (Admin), [2006] All ER (D) 147 at [14].
27. Steel and Others v United Kingdom (1998) 28 EHRR 603.
28. 592 P. 2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
29. It has been argued that pure DDoS attacks caused by sending non-malformed standard data
packets are not an illegal access to a website but an action allowed by the system itself
(http://forum.theregister.co.uk/forum/1/2012/02/08/DDoS_attack_trends, accessed 3 May
2013).
30. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
31. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
32. Police Department v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
33. Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
34. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933–34 (1982).
35. ‘Concerted action is a powerful weapon. History teaches that special dangers are associated with
conspiratorial activity. And yet one of the foundations of our society is the right of individuals to
combine with other persons in pursuit of a common goal by lawful means.’ NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 US 886, 933–34 (1982).
36. Brief for Appellants at 15, Bell v. State, 27 Md. 302, 176 A.2d 771 (1962) (No.91).
37. Bell, 227 Md. At 305, 176 A.2d at 772.
38. Bell, 378 US at 314 (Goldberg J, concurring). See also cf. J Black dissenting: ‘And none of our
prior cases has held that a person’s right to freedom of expression carries with it a right to force a
private property owner to furnish his property as a platform to criticize the property owner’s use
of that property’, Bell v. Maryland 378 US 226 (1964) at 325.
39. Feldman (1993, 785).
40. ‘A law which primarily regulates conduct but which might also indirectly affect speech can be
upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct’, Justice
Black dissenting in Barenblatt v United States 360 US 109, 134 (1959) at 141). See also Brown
Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States 383 US 154 (1962).
41. Note, however, Justice Black’s warning of the danger of ‘government paralysis’ carried by the
invasion of public buildings for various purposes outside their designated use. Brown
v. Louisiana 383 U.S. 131 (1966) at 165.
42. Digital Sit-ins: DDoS is legitimate civil disobedience – Anonymous: We Are Legion, available
online at http://anonyops.org/post/16585162289/digital-sit-ins-ddos-is-legitimate-civil-
disobedience, accessed 3 May 2013.
43. DDoS Survey: Q1 2012 - When Businesses Go Dark, available online at http://hello.neustar.biz/
rs/neustarinc/images/neustar-insights-ddos-attack-survey-q1-2012.pdf, accessed 3 May 2013.
44. Report of the special Rapporteur on the Promotion and protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (2011) at 66.
45. Ensemble (1996, 18).
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